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Funding for longer lives. Retirement 
wallet and risk-sharing annuities
Longevity increases and population ageing create challenges for all societal institutions, particularly 
those providing retirement income, health care, and long-term care services. At the individual level, 
an obvious question is how to ensure all retirees have an adequate, secure, stable and predictable 
lifelong income stream that will allow them to maintain a target standard of living for however long 
the individual lives. In this paper we introduce and discuss the concept of retirement wallet repre-
senting the multiple income and service sources individuals and their families will have to fund for 
longer lives. We then address the main decumulation risks and options, including the adoption of a 
given longevity insurance strategy, of a programmed withdrawal strategy and of an investment strat-
egy. The main payout options available for allocating assets accumulated in pension plans are dis-
cussed, particularly the role of traditional and innovative investment and longevity risk-sharing 
structures. We provide illustrative results for the price of innovative participating longevity-linked 
life annuities (PLLAs) that link benefits to the dynamics of both a longevity index and an interest 
rate adjustment factor using Spanish mortality and financial market data.
La longevidad aumenta y el envejecimiento de la población crea desafíos para todas las instituciones 
sociales, particularmente aquellas que proporcionan ingresos de jubilación, atención médica y 
servicios de atención a largo plazo. A nivel individual, una pregunta obvia es cómo garantizar que 
todos los jubilados tengan un flujo de ingresos de por vida, adecuado, seguro, estable y predecible que 
les permita mantener un nivel de vida objetivo durante el tiempo que dure la vida individual. En este 
estudio presentamos y discutimos el concepto de la cartera de jubilación, que representa las múltiples 
fuentes de ingresos y servicios que las personas y sus familias tendrán que financiar para una vida más 
larga. A continuación, abordamos los principales riesgos y opciones de decumulación, incluida la 
adopción de una estrategia dada de seguro de longevidad, de una estrategia programada de retiro y de 
una estrategia de inversión. Se discuten las principales opciones de pago disponibles para asignar los 
activos acumulados en los planes de pensiones, en particular, el papel de las estructuras de inversiones 
tradicionales e innovadoras y de riesgo compartido de longevidad. Proporcionamos resultados 
ilustrativos por el precio de las participativas rentas vitalicias innovadoras vinculadas a la longevidad 
(PLLA), que vinculan los beneficios a la dinámica del índice de longevidad y un factor de ajuste de la 
tasa de interés, utilizando la mortalidad española y los datos del mercado financiero.
Bizitza-luzeeraren etengabeko hazkundeak erronka berriak sortzen dizkie gizarte-erakundeei; bereziki, er-
retirokoei, arreta medikukoei eta epe luzeko arreta-zerbitzuetako diru-sarrerak ematen dituztenei. Maila 
indibidualari begiratuta sortzen den galdera begi-bistakoa da: Nola bermatu erretirodun guztiek bizi 
diren artean beren bizi-maila objetiboari eusteko moduko diru-sarreren fluxu egokia, segurua, egonkorra 
eta aurreikusteko modukoa izango dutela? Azterlan honetan, aurkeztu eta eztabaidatu egiten dugu erreti-
ro-zorroaren kontzeptua; hain zuzen, pertsonek eta haien familiek bizi-luzetasuna finantzatzeko beharko 
dituzten diru-sarreren eta zerbitzuen iturri anitzak barnebiltzen dituena. Jarraian, erretiroan aurrezkiak 
baliatzearen arrisku eta aukera nagusiei helduko diegu, horren barnean kokatuta bizitza luzapenaren ase-
gururako estrategia jakin bat izatea, erretiro-estrategia programatu bat izatea zein inbertsio-estrategia bat 
izatea. Horrez gain, eztabaidatzen ditugu pentsio-planetan metatutako aktiboak esleitzeko dauden or-
dainketa-aukera nagusiak ere, zehazki, inbertsio-egitura tradizional eta berritzaileen eta bizitzak luza-
tzearen arrisku partekatuko egituren zeregina. Bestalde, emaitza argigarriak azaltzen ditugu bizi-
luzetasunari lotuta dauden biziarteko errenta berritzaile (PLLA) parte-hartzaileen prezioei buruz. 
Emaitzek bizi-luzetasunaren indizearen dinamikaren onurak eta interes-tasaren doikuntza-faktore bat 
uztartzen dituzte, horre-tarako, Espainiako hilkortasuna eta finantza-merkatuko datuak erabilita.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Increased longevity is probably one of the most important socioeconomic advanc-
es to happen to mankind. Longevity improvements initiated only about two centuries 
ago in the then advanced economies and has since spread around the world and across 
all socioeconomic groups in a non-uniform way (Ayuso, Bravo and Holzmann, 
2017a,b). While a welcome development, longer lives and population ageing create 
challenges for all societal institutions (including the family), public and private, par-
ticularly those providing retirement income, health care, and long-term care services. 
At the individual level, an obvious question is how to ensure all retirees have an ade-
quate, secure, stable and predictable lifelong income stream that will allow them to 
maintain a target standard of living for however long the individuals lives. In other 
words, how to guarantee an income and service stream that not only covers the basic 
expenditure needs but also is enough to achieve the full lifestyle individuals aspire in 
retirement. The answer to this question is not trivial and depends heavily on different 
factors such as the effects of institutions, government regulations and interventions 
(e.g., pension system architecture, role of occupational/personal pensions, DB/DC na-
ture, minimum income guarantees), social networks (e.g., family structure and inter-
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connectedness, informal care networks), on individual preferences (e.g., regarding 
continuing to work after retirement, bequest, lifecycle planning), family background 
and family shocks (e.g., inheritances, divorce) that prevent accumulation or accelerate 
decumulation, financial system development (e.g., the existence of efficient capital and 
insurance markets) or the risks involved in the generation of retirement income (e.g., 
investment, inflation, contribution, political, longevity, liquidity, behavioural). De-
pends also on general policy goals and constraints on fiscal policy, old-age poverty, tax 
neutrality over the life cycle, redistribution objectives, intergenerational fairness or the 
political economy of an ageing society. To fund for longer lives, people will ultimately 
rely on a combination of state, employer, social institutions, family, own savings (in-
cluding housing wealth), continued labour income, and insurance sources, with 
weights determined by both personal and institutional circumstances.
In Figure 1 we highlight the magnitude of the retirement planning horizons in-
dividual face by plotting the dynamics of observed and forecasted period life expec-
tancy estimates computed for Spain for both male and female populations and se-
lected ages from 1960 to 2050. Estimates were computed using a Bayesian Model 
Ensemble (Averaging) technique of six well know generalized age-period-cohort 
stochastic mortality models fitted to Spanish mortality data from 1960 to 2017 (Bra-
vo, Ayuso and Holzmann, 2019; Bravo, 2019). We can observe a clear almost linear 
positive trend in life expectancy at all ages, with sex differentials slightly increasing 
for the oldest-old. As of today (2019), the remaining lifetime of a Spanish female 
(male) alive at age 60 is 27.76 (23.20), but by mid-century (2050) is forecasted to be 
30.12 (25.74). However, empirical studies worldwide show that remaining lifetime is 
increasing faster than healthy life expectancy, which means that starting from 
around age 70 individuals and the society will have to provide for not only regular 
income but increasing health care costs and, most significantly, care costs, which for 
an increasing proportion of the older population will reach «ruinous» levels.
The demographic change underway in developed and developing countries, the 
increasing problems of traditional pay-as-you-go old-age social security systems, the 
fiscally driven public pension reforms, the move from non-funded (collective) de-
fined benefit (NDB) schemes towards (individualized) funded and defined contri-
bution (FDC) schemes, the decreasing generosity of public health care systems and 
of public annuities, with deep adequacy and poverty concerns in several countries 
and within certain groups of people (e.g., women, less-educated groups and mi-
grants), the reduction in the traditional family support at old-age because of falling 
fertility rates, urbanisation and migration, all have increased the need for additional 
private savings to cover the old age income gap and to avoid relying on state-man-
aged social transfers to counter the risks of poverty (Bravo & Holzmann, 2014; EC, 
2018). Moreover, the current prolonged low interest rates and inflation environ-
ment, linked to low economic growth directly affects savings for retirement and 
makes it difficult for insurance and pension systems to sustain long-term guarantees 
and deliver appropriate retirement income. In the current interest rate scenario, it 
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will take several decades for DC pensions system to build up to a reasonable level 
which means time is also part of the equation.
Figure 1.   SPAIN | PERIOD LIFE EXPECTANCY FORECAST BY SEX  
 FOR SELECTED AGES, 1960-2050
Note: Period life expectancy values computed using a Bayesian Model Ensemble (Averaging) technique of six 
generalized age-period-cohort stochastic mortality models fitted to Spanish mortality data from 1960 to 2017.
Source: Author’s preparation.
In this paper we introduce and discuss the concept of retirement wallet repre-
senting the multiple income and service sources individuals and their families will 
have to fund for longer lives, comprising not only traditional public and private 
pension fund sources but also new important alternatives like equity release schemes 
and insurance mechanisms (Section 2). We then address the main decumulation 
risks and options, including the adoption of a given longevity insurance strategy, the 
design, advantages and limitations of programmed withdrawal strategies, and chal-
lenges posed by liability-driven investing (LDI) strategies (Section 3). The main pay-
out options available for allocating assets accumulated in pension plans are dis-
cussed, particularly the role of traditional and innovative investment and longevity 
risk-sharing structures. We provide illustrative results for the price of innovative 
participating longevity-linked life annuities (PLLAs) that link benefits to the dynam-
ics of both a longevity index and an interest rate adjustment factor using Spanish 
mortality and financial market data. Section 4 concludes.
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2. FUNDING FOR LONGER LIVES: THE RETIREMENT WALLET
Planning for retirement individuals requires individuals to clearly understand 
their specific needs, vulnerabilities and preferences at old age, the likelihood of ex-
periencing specific life events (e.g., experiencing changes in physical and mental 
health, losing partner, caring for spouse or other family members, changing hous-
ing, starting another career), their financial goals, the income (and services) sources 
they anticipate in the accumulation and decumulating phases and the risks they are 
willing to take. Typical old-age financial needs include having a minimum guaran-
teed income stream that smooths the transition from working life to retirement and 
protects from the eroding effect of inflation on the purchasing power of money, 
having an extra income to guarantee access to health-care and long-term care ser-
vices (medicines, dental care, care at home, nursing home care), bequeathing (cash 
inheritance, housing wealth, grandchildren‘s education, funeral expenses, dona-
tions) or paying for life style activities (e.g., travelling). To fund for longer lives, 
people will ultimately rely on a retirement wallet comprising public and private pen-
sions (state, linked to an employment relationship or occupational, based on con-
tracts between individuals and private pension providers), private savings (divi-
dends, coupon payments, cash withdrawals), housing wealth, continued labour 
income, insurance, family and social institutions (Figure 2).
Figure 2.  FUNDING FOR LONGER LIVES: THE RETIREMENT WALLET
Source: Author’s elaboration.
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Table 1.  ASSETS IN PENSION FUNDS AND ALL RETIREMENT VEHICLES  
 IN 2018
OECD 
countries
Pension funds
All
 re
tire
me
nt 
veh
icle
s
 
Selected 
other 
jurisdictions
Pension funds
All
 re
tire
me
nt 
veh
icle
s
in USD 
million
% of 
GDP
% of  
GDP  
%  
change
in USD 
million
% of 
GDP
% of 
GDP
Australia 1.810.346 132,6 135,4   Albania 32,9 21 0,1 0,1
Austria 24.508 5,5 ..   Armenia 50,2 329 2,6 ..
Belgium 37.531 7,3 ..   Botswana -3,7 7.358 40,8 ..
Canada 1.459.272 85,6 ..   Brazil 7,9 223.193 12,6 ..
Chile 193.110 70,2 70,2   Bulgaria 5,7 7.881 12,5 12,5
Czech 
Republic 20.935 8,9 8,9   Colombia 0,2 70.607 23,5 23,5
Denmark 154.373 45,4 199,0   Costa Rica 13,9 11.527 20,2 20,2
Estonia 4.511 15,4 16,9   Croatia 6,5 16.028 27,2 27,3
Finland 127.560 47,7 ..   Dominican Republic 14,3 10.073 12,6 12,6
France 19.007 0,7 ..   Egypt 10,0 3.757 1,5 1,5
Germany 261.058 6,7 ..   El Salvador 6,6 10.648 40,9 ..
Greece 1.584 0,7 ..   Ghana 18,1 2.700 4,4 4,4
Hungary 5.876 3,9 5,3   Guyana 21,5 309 8,3 8,3
Iceland 36.328 150,8 160,1   Hong Kong, China 0,5 148.531 40,9 40,9
Ireland 115.073 31,6 33,5   Indonesia 2,2 18.020 1,8 ..
Israel 203.224 57,4 ..   Isle of Man 6,6 14.321 .. ..
Italy 153.430 7,6 9,8   Jamaica 14,6 4.750 30,2 30,2
Japan 1.398.144 28,2 ..   Kenya 8,0 11.452 12,9 12,9
Korea 191.066 12,0 ..   Kosovo 2,2 1.934 25,0 25,0
Latvia 529 1,6 13,8   Malawi 37,6 944 13,7 13,7
Lithuania 3.689 7,1 7,1   Maldives 19,5 568 10,7 10,7
Luxembourg 1.883 2,8 ..   Namibia 9,5 10.213 80,2 91,3
…/…
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OECD 
countries
Pension funds
All
 re
tire
me
nt 
veh
icle
s
  Selected 
other 
jurisdictions
Pension funds
All
 re
tire
me
nt 
veh
icle
s
in USD 
million
% of 
GDP
% of  
GDP  
%  
change
in USD 
million
% of 
GDP
% of 
GDP
Mexico 168.311 14,1 ..   Nigeria 14,9 28.136 6,7 6,7
Netherlands 1.514.345 171,0 ..   North Macedonia 13,2 1.228 10,0 10,0
New Zealand 54.481 27,4 27,4   Pakistan 10,3 185 0,1 ..
Norway 39.834 9,8 ..   Panama 3,7 557 0,9 ..
Poland 42.112 7,5 ..   Papua New Guinea 6,8 3.825 18,2 18,2
Portugal 22.292 9,7 ..   Peru -1,8 45.469 20,7 20,7
Slovak 
Republic 12.038 11,7 11,7   Romania 19,4 12.176 5,2 5,2
Slovenia 2.954 5,6 6,8   Russia 1,4 81.456 5,5 5,5
Spain 121.421 8,8 12,5   Serbia 10,9 389 0,8 0,8
Sweden 22.610 4,1 90,6   Suriname 3,5 467 13,6 ..
Switzerland 888.799 126,9 ..   Thailand 4,4 35.094 7,0 ..
Turkey 14.520 2,1 ..   Ukraine 11,3 98 0,1 ..
United 
Kingdom 2.809.112 104,5 ..   Uruguay 7,3 15.438 27,1 27,1
United States 15.637.266 76,3 135,1   Total -4,1 799.686 10,3  
OECD Total 27.573.129 53,3      
Notes: «..» means not available.
Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics; French Asset Management Association; Bank of Japan; Bank of Korea; 
Swiss Occupational Pension Supervisory Commission; AIOS (for El Salvador and Panama). 
In most countries, public pension schemes (DB, DC, funded or unfunded) pro-
vide at least a basic income level, with varying generosity levels depending on the 
structure of the pension system and on financial system development. Empirical evi-
dence shows that private pension plans financed through pension funds, pension in-
surance contracts, book reserves or other vehicles (e.g., bank or investment compa-
nies managed funds) are becoming more widespread, but there are still enormous 
differences in the coverage and significance of private pension provisions across ju-
risdictions even after accounting for the size of the population or domestic economy 
(Table 1) and the contribution amounts are insignificant in most cases (see, e.g., 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), ECB 2016). 
…/…
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Most DC scheme members have not contributed enough to receive even a mod-
est income stream in retirement. For instance, pension funds held assets worth less 
than 1% of GDP in France or Greece while they held 171% of GDP in the Nether-
lands, 150.8% in Iceland or 132.6% in Australia. Assets earmarked for retirement in 
pension funds represented 53.3% of the GDP of the OECD area but just over 10.3% 
of the GDP of the other jurisdictions reported in Table 1. When considering the 
whole private pension system, i.e., including for other vehicles used to save for re-
tirement (e.g., pension rights included in employers’ books, pension insurance and 
retirement saving contracts), Denmark and Iceland have the largest amount of pen-
sion assets relative to GDP.
For the contrary, building up housing wealth through homeownership and mort-
gage repayment is by far the main way European households set aside for old age (ECB, 
2016). In the Euro area countries, the household’s wealth (excluding pension wealth, the 
present value of all future expected pension benefits) is primarily held in the form of real 
assets, which represent 82.2% of total assets owned by households (85.1% in Spain), 
with the remaining assets (17.8%) being financial. The largest component of real assets is 
the household main residence (HMR), representing 60.2% of total real assets, followed 
by other real estate property (22.3%). In the EU, roughly 70% of Europeans live in own-
er-occupied accommodation, ownership is higher in poorer countries and the propor-
tion of home owners by age band has been steadily increasing with each successive gen-
eration. Empirical evidence also shows that homeowners are generally wealthier than 
their non-home owning counterparts, and this conclusion is valid across the income or 
net wealth distribution and across countries (Bravo, Ayuso & Holzmann, 2019).
Personal pensions and private homeownership are the two main assets individuals 
hold to finance (supplement) retirement consumption in an asset-based approach to 
welfare in which individuals accept greater responsibility for their own welfare needs. 
They both involve long-term saving and investment decisions over the life cycle, they 
are motivated by potentially competing objectives and generate different options and 
outcomes at old-age. Home homeownership provides a stream of housing services 
starting at time of house acquisition and represents wealth which could be liquidated 
in old age if needed. The asset serves both consumption and investment functions, 
which are assessed differently by households based on their personal preferences. Con-
trary to renting, home ownership is often regarded by individuals as an investment in 
asset-building, a better option to cope with inflation and to profit from house price 
appreciation. Access to affordable housing is crucial to any retirement income system 
since it contributes to reduce poverty by allowing retirees to maintain an adequate 
standard of living (Bravo, Ayuso & Holzmann, 2019). The question now is how to 
manage and access housing wealth in an efficient way to supplement your retirement 
wallet. In the next section we offer a catalogue of Equity Release Mechanisms (ERS), 
distinguishing between equity release is made possible while continuing to stay in their 
home or through a sale of the house and other design differences (e.g., time of release, 
owner of the property, amount of equity released).
JORGE BRAVO
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Figure 3.  DECOMPOSITION OF REAL ASSETS BY ASSET CATEGORY,  
 EURO AREA
Notes: Shares of real assets types on total real assets by euro area country. The HFCS classifies real assets into five 
categories: the HMR, other real estate property, vehicles, valuables (valuable jewellery, antiques or art) and self-
employment businesses.
Source: Own composition based on Household Finance and Consumption Survey (2016), 2nd wave. 
The role of family in the retirement wallet is still significant in most countries, 
particularly in the form of a service annuity, but family support is expected to be 
reduced in the future due to smaller family sizes, fewer children to provide care, 
changing family composition and higher children’s mobility, higher women la-
bour participation (who traditionally provide care). In many countries, individu-
als also receive support (e.g., social assistance, care) from local/municipal social 
institutions (e.g., retirement community, senior living communities). Even 
though insurance is well established in most developed markets, evidence shows 
that, with few exceptions, it still plays a minor role in the retirement wallet of old-
er people. Some of the most important risks and concerns individuals face during 
retirement (e.g., outliving one’s wealth, longevity, health-care, long-term care, in-
vestment, inflation, interest rate, funeral expenses) are insurable risks and tradi-
tional and innovative solutions have been developing to address them in a cost-ef-
ficient manner. An ageing population is expected to increase the role for 
insurance in private market provision of retirement income and risk mitigating/
sharing solutions, particularly in the decumulation stage.
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Finally, contrary to traditional models of labour supply, including the standard 
versions of the lifecycle model which assume retirement is an absorbing state, em-
pirical evidence suggests that the share of labour income from continued work after 
statutory retirement age is increasing and the trend is persistent, with labour force 
participation rates of 65 year-olds or more now surpassing 25% in many countries 
(e.g., Korea, Japan), including countries with relatively generous public pension 
(and health-care) benefits (Figure 4). Unretirement is more likely amongst individ-
uals in better health, with a higher level of educational attainment or who have a 
spouse in the labour market, but one should not neglect involuntary retirement sit-
uations, financial illiteracy amongst individuals approaching retirement and unre-
tirement due to financial constraints as possible causes for this trend.
The build-up and management of the retirement wallet will be different for each 
individual and there is no guarantee that individuals optimize consumption over 
their active and retirement period as predicted by the lifecycle hypothesis. Indeed, 
there is growing empirical evidence suggesting that the actual wealth accumulation, 
preservation and decumulation behaviour before and after retirement is often in 
conflict with lifecycle predictions, particularly when analysed considering the differ-
entiated approach across the three main tiers of the population:  (i) The lowest tier 
that typically does little saving and, as result, will have no capacity to dissave after 
retirement; (ii) The top tier that continues the accumulation of financial and non-fi-
nancial asset after retirement and shows no sign of dissaving; (iii) The middle tier 
that seems to be the only one showing sign of life-cycle saving and dissaving, par-
ticularly those with no longevity insurance (public of private life annuity), but faces 
a number of constraints (e.g., illiquid housing wealth assets, the taxation of pen-
sions, undeveloped financial and insurance markets).1
Several explanations have been put forward to explain why households deviate 
from the lifecycle hypothesis, saving in the top tiers more than predicted and often 
not decumulating their housing wealth (Figure 5). They include uncertainty regard-
ing retirement income (e.g., investment risk), shocks that prevent accumulation 
(e.g., unemployment spells and scarring effects2), precautionary behaviour to face 
major family shocks (e.g., death of a spouse, divorce), uninsured future health care 
and long-term expenditures, evidence showing that individuals care about their de-
scendants (intended bequests), behavioural and cultural biases, outdated social 
norms and psychological barriers, mental-accounting (precautionary) savings be-
haviour, the design and implementation of mandated earnings-related retirement 
schemes across countries including minimum income (and service) guarantees and 
related provisions, pensions taxation regimes that penalize accumulating or decu-
mulation, low risk appetite and financial literacy, and the heterogeneity in longevity 
by income levels (Holzmann et al., 2019).
1  See Holzmann et al. (2019) for an extensive literature review and conjectured research hypothesis.
2  See, e.g., Bravo and Herce (2019) and references therein.
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Figure 4.  OLD-AGE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE  
 (65-YEAR-OLDS OR MORE)
Source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics; Note: 2018 or latest data available.
Figure 5.  DEVIATION FROM LIFECYCLE ACCUMULATION  
 AND DECUMULATION 
Source: Based on Holzmann et al. (2019) with authors’ additions. 
3. RISK-SHARING OPTIONS FOR THE PAYOUT PHASE OF PENSIONS
The decumulation or payout phase of pensions is as important as the accumula-
tion of financial, real and social wealth for retirement. Yet, while the accumulation 
phase of retirement saving has attracted most of the attention of industry and re-
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search, the pay-out phase has been much less explored. Decumulation is the process of 
converting the retirement wallet into a flow of income and services for retirement. De-
cumulation requires individuals to decide upon a retirement strategy, comprising: 
•	 A longevity insurance strategy, determining the provisions taken by individ-
uals to guarantee they do not outlive their retirement wallet; This typically 
requires having a public or a private annuity, immediate or deferred, but re-
cently other forms of longevity risk pooling have been proposed (e.g., ALDA, 
tontines, tonnuity, pooled annuity funds)
•	 A withdrawal strategy, specifying how to withdrawing cash from the retire-
ment pot to finance regular consumption expenditures; This typically re-
quires individuals to adopt simple rules (e.g., withdraw every year a fraction 
of the remaining life expectancy or a constant percentage of the retirement 
wallet) and must include a strategy to release equity from the housing wealth 
accumulated and/or inherited during working life, paying off outstanding 
debt and bequest arrangements.
•	 An investment strategy, determining how to maximize the retirement wallet’s 
return; This involves defining a riskier or more conservative asset allocation 
strategy, depending on one’s risk aversion. The benchmark for assessing the 
investment performance is not in this case in terms of an asset benchmark but 
in terms of a given liability cash flow stream (consumption expenditures), i.e., 
this is a liability-driven investing (LDI) strategy. Stated differently, in most cas-
es managing a dedicated retirement pot requires assets to be invested with the 
primary objective of meeting current and future guaranteed or envisaged (tar-
geted) consumption expenditures with an acceptable level of risk.
•	 Efficient and effective administration, protection of assets and appropriate 
value for money assessment.
3.1.  Key risk sources during decumulation
It is important to be aware of the risks involved in the generation of retirement 
income from the retirement wallet. The key risks are listed in Table 2. There are sev-
eral ways of dealing with such risks, including: (i) intra-generational risk pooling 
(the risks are pooled amongst individuals of a given cohort); (ii) Inter-generational 
risk sharing (the risks are shared between individuals of different cohorts); (iii) the 
hedging of risks using suitable hedging instruments; (iv) Risk mitigation by engag-
ing in diversified investment strategies; (v) Adopting carefully designed default in-
vestment o withdrawal plans; (vi) Adopting effective regulation, e.g., against market 
conduct risk, credit risk and costs risk; (vi) Insurance, e.g., against individual lon-
gevity risk, health-care costs or long-term dependency risks, (vii) Public and private 
financial education programmes that promote rational informed choices. Unfortu-
nately, many people do not understand the risks and, thus, cannot be expected to be 
able to manage these risks themselves. For them, auto-enrolment in a well-designed 
default decumulation strategy at retirement seems to be the best option.
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Table 2.  KEY RISK SOURCES DURING THE DECUMULATION  
 OF PENSIONS
Risk Definition
Individual 
longevity
Risk of outliving the retirement pot or experiencing a substantial reduction in 
retirement income, being forced to modify their standard of living 
(consumption) drastically.
Aggregate 
longevity
Risk that overall population lives longer than anticipated (systematic or 
aggregate longevity risk) forcing, e.g., a reduction in public pension benefits
Investment The risk that portfolio investment performance is worse than expected or the 
risk that the LDI investment strategy do not generate income in a way that 
matches the desired pattern of consumption in retirement; Maybe a result of 
a bad product choice.
Inflation The risk that a generalised rise in prices will result in an erosion of the real 
value of pensions payments and retirement income. For example, over 30 
years a nominal fixed pension amount loses about 45% (78%) of its real 
purchasing power, when the inflation rate is 2% (5%) per annum.
Health Risk that a sudden or increasing deterioration in the health of an individual 
significantly increases his or her health-care expenditure or requires expensive 
long-term care services.
Liquidity Risk that accumulated retirement savings are not easily convertible (at least, 
not without a significant loss of principal) in liquidity, either for legal or 
contractual reasons.
Retirement 
timing risk
Uncertainty about when the scheme member will retire from labour market 
and/or begin to make withdrawals
Bequest Most individuals have an altruistic approach to life and care about their 
closest relatives. They get satisfaction from knowing that their heirs will enjoy 
their inherited wealth once they die. Because of this, many parents want to 
leave their children their family home, leave money behind when they die, 
transfer some wealth to future generations or institutions.
Annuitisation Mandatory annuitization may take place at the worst time, i.e., interest rates 
may be low at the point of annuity purchase generating lower than expected 
retirement income.
Political and 
regulatory
The risk that either public of private pension system providers may be forced 
to reduce their pension payments, because pension systems are financially 
unsustainable or as a result of a political decision and the risk that regulations 
change in an adverse way.
Taxes Risk that a variation in the regulatory or tax environment will reduce the 
disposable retirement income, e.g., an increase in income tax rates or 
deductions, an increase in VAT taxes, an increase in capital market taxes.
Life events Divorce, death of spouse/partner, etc.
Behavioural Risk that pensioners behave in a way that is not considered to be rational, 
incapacity to make an ‘informed choice’ due to insufficient financial literacy 
and understanding of risks
Market 
conduct and 
credit risk
The risk that financial and non-financial service providers act in a way that 
disadvantages retirees and credit risk referring to the events after which 
companies or individuals will be unable to make the required payments on 
their debt or contract obligations.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Bravo and Holzmann (2014) and Blake (2016).
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3.2. The decumulation menu
The main forms of retirement payout options available for allocating assets ac-
cumulated in DC pension plans include lump sum payments, programmed or 
phased withdrawals, life annuities and hybrid solutions. The possibility of taking ac-
cumulated financial savings as a cash lump sum is typically dependent both on the 
contractual arrangements defined by the pension plan and the tax rules in force in a 
particular jurisdiction. Lump sum payments offer retirees full flexibility in the use of 
accumulated savings, including spending on leisure activities (holidays, cruises, 
spending on hobbies or buying a car, boat, caravan, etc.), passing on part of their re-
tirement pot to children or other family members, investing in new or additional 
property, paying off a mortgage on a house or other debts, or simply continue to 
pursue an investment strategy, benefiting from potential higher returns on equity 
markets and other assets. A major advantage of lump sum payments is the ability of 
retirees to «self-annuitize», at a time and on a basis that best suits their financial 
needs. However, However, lump sum payments also encompass significant disad-
vantages, particularly the fact that they do not provide any protection against indi-
vidual or aggregate longevity risk, they expose retirees to investment, credit and in-
flation risks, they demand individuals to have the knowledge to manage their 
retirement accounts wisely and efficiently and require individuals to maintain a 
long-term financial discipline to minimize the risk of outliving their retirement pot.
Under a programmed withdrawal strategy, retirees make periodic strategic and 
systematic withdrawals or lump sum payments from their retirement wallet to cover 
necessary expenses, instead of buying an annuity or receiving a single lump sum 
payment. The individual maintains the control and ownership of its assets, decides 
upon the investment strategy but there is no biometrical risk-pooling. The regular 
income flows may be the result of an explicit withdrawal rule or plan (e.g. the so-
called 4% sustainable withdrawal rule, a fraction of the remaining life expectancy at 
the retirement age, possibly with lower and upper bounds, a constant amount) or 
simply be the result of discretionary actions. Although self-managed products are 
available, normally retirement withdrawal products are delegated management re-
tirement products under which the account management activities are allocated to 
the asset management company. Programmed withdrawal has some advantages 
compared to annuity purchase (higher liquidity and flexibility to respond to unex-
pected consumption expenditures, retaining control over retirement assets, poten-
tially higher pay-outs due to enhanced investment returns, possibility to allocate as-
sets to inflation-linked investments, compatibility with the bequest motive, death 
benefit options), but also several drawbacks. The main disadvantages include the 
lack of protection against longevity risk, significant exposure to investment risk, 
there is no survival credit (mortality cross subsidy) when compared to buying an 
annuity contract, retirees are exposed to annuitisation risk if they decide to post-
pone annuity purchase to a later age, exposure to inflation risk and higher operating 
expenses when compared to the purchase of an annuity.
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The most traditional pay-out solution for generating a predictable income 
stream in retirement is a life annuity. Annuity products offer protection against lon-
gevity risk and an extra return conditional on survival through pooling mechanisms 
but leave retirees with no control over assets and no flexibility in the use of accumu-
lated assets, for instance, to address the bequest motive. There are many types of an-
nuities that can be differentiated, for instance, by the nature of payment, by the 
number of people covered, by the duration of payments, by the time that payouts 
commence, by the frequency of premium payments, by the distribution channel and 
types of options included, among other features (figure 6). Importantly, the most 
commonly used type of annuities, nominal level annuities, provides certainty of in-
come in nominal terms but offers no protection against inflation risk. Escalating 
nominal (real) annuities provide partial (full) protection against inflation but offer 
initially lower payments when compared to level annuities.
An annuity contract can be divided into two phases: the accumulation phase, 
when premiums are paid and capital builds up, and the decumulation phase when 
the benefits are paid out. The premium the insured (annuitant) must pay can be ei-
ther a single, fixed periodic, or a variable periodic payment. The pay-out phase can 
follow the accumulation phase immediately (immediate annuity) or after a specified 
period (deferred annuity, advanced life deferred annuity – ALDA) or when your re-
tirement pot is exhausted (Ruin Contingency Life Annuity – RCLA). While an im-
mediate annuity is provided in exchange for a one-off lump sum, a deferred annuity 
is usually financed through regular premium payments. The amount the insurance 
company pays out can be conditional on the survival of just one (single annuity) or 
more than one individual, such as the spouse (joint and survivor annuities).
Regarding the duration of pay-outs, benefit payments can continue while the 
annuitant is alive (life annuity), up to a specified date (annuity certain), the earlier 
of the two (temporary annuity) or the later of the two (guaranteed annuity). The 
duration of pay-outs is the most important feature in connection with longevity 
risk. In the case of a guarantee period, the periodical payments will be made to the 
annuitant or to the heirs for a certain period (e.g. ten-years), regardless of whether 
the annuitant is alive. Guarantee periods as well as joint and survivor annuities are 
included to address the reduced bequest potential of a level annuity contract, since 
they continue to be paid out also when the annuitant passes away. Including these 
features comes, of course, at the expense of a lower survival credit (rate of return). 
Recent developments in this area include modern Tontines, a non-insurance con-
tract structure (the insurance company’s role is merely administrative) created to 
pool the longevity risk of a group of participants with the purpose to pay an income 
for life but with no guarantees, i.e., the pool of policyholders bears the aggregate 
longevity risk (see, e.g., Milevsky & Salisbury, 2015, 2016). Recently, a so-called To-
nuity combining the appealing features of tontine and conventional life annuity has 
been proposed (Chen, Hieber & Klein, 2017).
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Figure 6.  TYPES OF LIFE ANNUITIES
Source: Author’s elaboration.
The way the accumulated capital is paid out during the pay-out phase depends 
on the annuity type. The simplest is one which provides guaranteed constant nomi-
nal lifetime payment (nominal fixed annuity). Apart from that, variable annuities 
can adopt different forms. Annuity benefits can rise (or fall) at a prescribed fixed 
nominal rate that escalates with the age of the annuitant (escalating annuity); they 
can be indexed to inflation, thus providing a guaranteed income in real terms (infla-
tion linked or real annuity); they can be linked to observed survival probability (lon-
gevity-linked life annuity); they can depend on the insurance company’s surplus 
(participating or with profit annuity); or even reflect the performance of an under-
lying investment portfolio, usually represented by a family of mutual funds (invest-
ment-linked or variable annuity). In some annuities, pay-outs can also participate in 
mortality risk. In the case of with-profits (or participating) annuities, annuitants 
share both investment and longevity risk but gain the benefit of risk-pooling.
Variable annuities with guarantees have been developed to meet retiree de-
mands more effectively than fixed annuities, namely claims for some upside mar-
ket potential and increasing flexibility. The most popular product offering these 
advantages is the variable annuity (VA), a unit-linked product commonly sold 
with guarantees. The most common guarantees included in these contracts are: (i) 
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Guaranteed minimum death benefit (GMDB); (ii) Guaranteed minimum income 
benefit (GMIB); (iii) Guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit (GMWB); (iv) 
Guaranteed lifetime withdrawal benefit (GLWB); (v) Guaranteed minimum accu-
mulation benefit (GMAB).
3.3.  An innovative structure: Participating Longevity-Linked Life annuities
Pension funds and annuity providers face uncertainty regarding financial re-
turns and systematic longevity risk due to unexpected future mortality improve-
ments. Although advances in longevity are not homogenous across socioeconomic 
groups, providing an efficient risk pooling mechanism that addresses the (individu-
al) uncertainty of death through the provision of a lifetime annuity is one of the 
main mechanisms pension schemes are considered to redistribute income in a wel-
fare-enhancing manner. Without such an instrument, individuals risk outliving 
their accumulated (financial, housing, pension) wealth or leaving unintended be-
quests to his/her dependents. Traditional (fixed, inflation-indexed) life annuities are 
a key instrument in mandated Defined Benefit (DB) pension schemes, in financial 
(FDC) and non-financial Notional (NDC) Defined Contribution schemes and in 
private pensions provided by insurance companies. Contrary to standard Modigli-
ani life-cycle model of savings and consumption prediction, the voluntary market 
purchase of retirement annuities is in most countries very limited and decreasing 
and the actual saving/dissaving behaviour after retirement is often at odds with eco-
nomic theory (Holzmann et al., 2019). A number of demand side (e.g., perceived 
poor value-for-money, the existence of annuity alternatives, bequest motives, be-
havioural and informational limitations) and supply-side (e.g., the regulatory bur-
den of annuity providers, with onerous capital requirements for unhedgeable risks 
(e.g., longevity risk) within Solvency II, nearly zero interest rate environment and 
significant interest rate risk exposure3, long-term financial risk, the cost of loss con-
trol and loss financing longevity risk management solutions, limited reinsurance ca-
pacity to absorb massive exposure-to-risk) arguments have been put forward to ex-
plain this «annuity puzzle», i.e., to explain why the level of annuitization by 
individuals is much smaller than economic theory would suggest (see, e.g., Milevs-
ky, M. (2013) and Holzmann (2015) for a review). Together with the development 
of capital market longevity-linked securities and their derivatives and innovative re-
insurance designs, this has increased the attention towards new contract structures 
involving financial and longevity risk sharing mechanisms between the annuity pro-
vider and annuitants, and increased recommendations towards the use of deferred 
annuities, that reduce the cost of guarantees and potentially augment their attrac-
tiveness to policyholders. 
3  See, e.g., Bravo and Silva (2006) and Simões, Oliveira and Bravo (2019) and Chamboko and Bravo 
(2016, 2019a,b) for single and multiple ALM interest rate risk immunization strategies for pension 
funds and annuity providers and for credit valuation problems.
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A number of alternative index-type and indemnity-type mechanisms have been 
proposed in the literature to directly or indirectly share financial and longevity risks 
between annuity providers and individuals. They typically involve updating the an-
nuity benefit according to observed mortality and investment developments. De-
pending on the contract design and underlying asset performance, future annuity 
benefits may decline with time, an undesirable feature that must be compensated at 
contract inception through lower prices or higher initial benefits (a risk premium). 
For instance, in investment-linked annuities payments fluctuate according to the ac-
tual return of the asset portfolio backing the contract. In traditional participating 
(with-profit) annuities payments depend on the providers overall performance re-
garding mortality, investments, and expenses. They provide guaranteed lifelong 
minimum annuity benefits in combination with participation in the insurer’s posi-
tive surpluses. Investment guarantees may be in the form of a «technical interest 
rate» implicit within the actuarial structure of the product or explicit as a minimum 
annual return (Olivieri and Pitacco, 2019).
In participating longevity-linked life annuities (PLLAs) benefits are updated peri-
odically based on the dynamics of both a longevity index, defined as the ratio between 
the expected survival probability and the survival rate observed in a reference popula-
tion, and of an interest rate adjustment factor, defined as the ratio between observed 
and guaranteed financial returns (Bravo and Freitas, 2018; Bravo, 2019).4 Alho, Bravo 
and Palmer (2012) investigate the consequences of introducing periodically revised 
annuities in NDC pension schemes and suggest updating benefits periodically based 
on the relationship between expected and observed period life expectancy. In this sec-
tion we briefly describe the benefit structure and risk sharing design of immediate PL-
LAs. We then introduce the valuation setup via embedded longevity option decompo-
sition. Consider an index-type participating longevity-linked life annuity (PLLA) 
along the lines proposed by Bravo and Freitas (2018). Under this contract, the annuity 
benefit is updated periodically based on both the observed survival experience of a ref-
erence pool and the investment performance of the financial assets backing the con-
tract. Without loss of generality, let us assume that annuitants contribute equal 
amounts into the annuity fund and, in return, receive equal annuity benefit payments 
bt at time t. Under this contract, the annual benefit at some future date t0 + k, bt0 + k 
will depart from the initial benefit bt0 depending on the dynamics of both a longevity 
factor It0 + k and an interest rate adjustment (IRA) factor Rt0 + k,
4  A similar but narrower approach can be found in Denuit, Haberman and Renshaw (2011) in which 
only the systematic component of longevity risk is passed to annuitants and caps and floors can be in-
troduced to limit the profit-loss share. A related approach is found in Bravo, Corte-Real and Silva 
(2009) in which annuity payments are updated only if observed survivorship rates exceed a given 
threshold.
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(1)
where It0 + k is a ratio between the expected survival probability and the survival 
rate observed in a reference population, defined by
(2)
with
(3)
denoting the k-year survival probability of some reference population cohort aged x0 
at time t0 (computed at contract inception on a market or national population life ta-
ble) and is the corresponding k-year survival probability observed at time 
tk and w the highest-attainable age. In (3) qx0 + j (t0 + j) is the 1-year death probabili-
ty of an individual aged x0 + j at time t0 + j. The IRA factor Rt0 k is defined by
(4)
Where Rt denotes the observed net investment return in year t and it0 is the (gener-
ally non-negative) guaranteed minimum interest rate set at time 0.
If Rt = it0
At and mortality improvements are as expected (i.e., It0 + k = 1 
A
 k), 
the arrangement resembles a classical life annuity with fixed-return, and fixed-bene-
fit. If Rt = it0 and observed longevity improvements are higher (lower) than predic-
ted i.e., It0 + k < 1 (It0 + k > 1) 
A
 k, annuity payments will decline (increase) along 
with the dynamics of It0 + k. If mortality improvements are as expected and invest-
ments perform above the guaranteed interest rate (i.e., Rt0 + k > 1 
A
 k), the extra re-
turn is returned to participants in the form of a higher benefit payment. If It0 + k < 1 
and  Rt0 + k > 1 the better than expected investment returns may at least partially 
compensate the negative impact of higher than expected mortality improvements. 
At annuity inception, the longevity and the IRA indexes are random variables and, 
hence, future annuity benefits are uncertain. This contrasts with traditional fixed life 
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annuity contracts that guarantee a constant benefit as long as the annuitant is alive, 
independently of longevity and financial performance developments, transferring 
thus all risks (financial and biometric) to the provider. Appropriate bounds to the 
longevity and IRA adjustment factors (or to the benefit amount) can in principle be 
introduced to offer partial guarantees, limit the volatility of annuity payments, to 
provide effective longevity insurance or to limit the profit-share (e.g., caps and 
floors, longevity corridors, partial participation mechanisms, a maximum age to ap-
ply the benefit adjustment). For instance, in Bravo and Freitas (2018) the authors 
suggest limiting the risk beared by policyholders by adding (possibly) time-depend-
ent upper and lower barriers for the longevity index.
The valuation of a PLLA at time t0 can be obtained via longevity option decom-
position. Following Bravo and Freitas (2018), the the fair value of a PLLA is decom-
posed into a long position in a classical fixed annuity and a short position 
in an embedded European-style longevity floor LF (t0) with underlying It0 + k, con-
stant strike equal to one unit of currency and maturity w	-	x0 i.e.,
(5)
with
(6)
where B(t,T) is the discount factor, a+= max(a,0) and, without loss of generality, we 
consider an immediate PLLA contract with initial benefit bt0 = 1 and a scenario in 
which observed longevity improvements are higher than predicted and investment 
performance matches the guaranteed interest rate.
In Table 3 for provide illustrative results for the price of non-participating PLLAs 
calibrated to the Spanish mortality data from 1960 to 2016 and for ages in the range 
60-95.5 Mortality data is obtained from the Human Mortality Database (2019). 
5  Detailed results can be obtained from the author upon request.
JORGE BRAVO
288
Ekonomiaz N.º 96, 2.º semestre, 2019
Table 3.  FAIR VALUE OF NON-PARTICIPATING PLLA AND EMBEDDED  
 LONGEVITY FLOOR OPTION PRICES
Age
60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Pure premium of a 
fixed life annuity 24.36 19.85 15.61 11.75 8.40 5.69 3.66
Longevity Floor price quantiles
2.5% 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
50% 1.55 1.16 0.80 0.50 0.28 0.13 0.06
97.5% 3.35 2.60 1.91 1.27 0.74 0.37 0.17
Longevity Floor price in 
% of ax0 (basis points)
636 584 515 429 331 234 159
PLLA pure premium 22.81 18.69 14.81 11.24 8.13 5.56 3.60
PLLA price quantiles
2.5% 26.16 21.29 16.72 12.51 8.86 5.93 3.77
97.5% 19.47 16.09 12.90 9.98 7.39 5.18 3.43
Notes: Guaranteed interest rate equal to 0%; Zero risk premium as reference life table; Market price of longevity 
risk set by l=0.3 (Wang Transform parameter); Annuity payments capped at the initial benefit. See Bravo and 
Freitas (2018) for details on the calibration of the risk neutral simulation approach. 
Source: Author’s elaboration.
The setting comprises a risk-neutral, frictionless and continuous financial mar-
ket in which the annuity provider invests the insurance premium in a portfolio of 
dividend-paying stocks (30%) and coupon bonds (70%), and a risk-free interest 
rate. We assume the yield curve dynamics is well captured by a two-factor equilibri-
um Vasicek (1977) model and the stock market index follows a standard geometric 
Brownian motion diffusion process. To account for the longevity risk premium in 
pricing the contracts, we compute cohort-specific risk-adjusted survival probabili-
ties by using a risk-neutral simulation approach assuming the dynamics of mortality 
rates is well represented by the log bilinear Lee-Carter model under a Poisson set-
ting, with time trend parameter modelled using a general ARIMA(p,d,q) model and 
risk neutral distribution of the innovations obtained using the Wang transform. The 
results are generated through 10.000 independent sample paths for both the survival 
probability of a cohort aged  in at time 0 and the portfolio returns.
As expected, the fair value of a fixed annuity is smaller the older the policyhold-
er at contract initiation, i.e., decreases with the reduction in the remaining life ex-
pectancy. Similarly, the longevity floor prices are increasing in maturity (decreasing 
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with the age of the policyholder at contract inception). For instance, for l=0.3 the 
longevity option price for a 60-year old individual at the end of 2016 is 1.55, where-
as for an equivalent contract starting at age 75 the price is 0.50. The embedded Eu-
ropean-style longevity floor prices represent between 1.59% and 6.36% of the pure 
premium of a conventional fixed annuity. This means, for instance, that a 60-year 
old male individual entering into a non-participating PLLA contract should pay a 
pure single premium 6.36% lower (22.81) than that of an equivalent fixed annuity 
(24.36) to accept the chance of annuity benefits declining if observed survivorship 
rates are higher than predicted. For this representative case, the 95% confidence in-
terval for the mean estimate of the fair value is [19.47–26.16] with mean estimate 
22.81. These results are in line with those obtained by Bravo and Freitas (2018) us-
ing data for France, although in this later case the higher trend risk observed in the 
French population resulted in higher longevity option prices.
Participating longevity-linked life annuities include embedded longevity and fi-
nancial options that allow the annuity provider to periodically revise annuity pay-
ments if observed survivorship and portfolio outcomes deviate from expected (or 
guaranteed) values at contract initiation. Contrary to standard fixed annuities in 
which the insurer bears all risk, PLLAs offer an efficient and transparent way of 
sharing biometric and financial market risks between annuity providers and policy-
holders. They are an interesting and promising product for the payout phase of pen-
sion schemes since the contract tackles some of the demand- and supply-side con-
straints that prevent individuals from annuitizing their retirement wealth and may 
contribute to help insurers writing new annuity policies. By linking the annuity ben-
efit to the survival experience of a given underlying population and to the perfor-
mance of the asset portfolio backing the contract PLLAs provide a direct mechanism 
to share financial and longevity risk and are an interesting alternative to manage sys-
tematic longevity risk in markets in which alternative risk management solutions 
(longevity-linked securities, reinsurance arrangements, capital allocation) are scarce 
and/or expensive.
4. FINAL REMARKS 
In this paper we discuss the main accumulation and decumulation options indi-
viduals will have to fund for longer lives. We highlight the role of traditional public 
and private pension schemes but also claim the importance of developing solutions 
to efficiently release equity from the main asset families hold at retirement: their 
house. Pension plan designs range from those in which all the risk stays with the 
plan (and plan sponsor) to those that increasingly share the risks with the partici-
pant. The family, social institutions and insurance providers significantly contribute 
to address the specific needs at old-age. We the analyse the main challenges posed 
during the decumulation phase and give special attention to novel solutions sharing 
investment and longevity risk between policyholders and annuity providers. Illustra-
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tive numerical results for the fair value of index-type participating longevity-linked 
life annuities (PLLA) are provided for Spain. Further research is also needed to de-
sign and valuate alternative methods to directly share longevity risk between the 
provider and annuitants.
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